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INTRODUcrrION
Fueled by two decades of scientific advancement, the United States
has experienced explosive technological growth in the computer,1 bio-
technology2 and communications3 industries. This explosion has not
only produced a vastly increased potential for profit, 4 but has also led
to a large number of defections by skilled employees, who establish
competing businesses or accept lucrative offers from existing competi-
tors. 5 It has also resulted in a shortened life-span for new technology,6
which increases costs7 relative to sales revenues and makes it necessary
for businesses to improve capital efficiency.8 These effects have pro-
duced a competitive marketplace in which the misappropriation of
1. See Gilburne & Johnston, Trade Secret Protection for Software Generally
and in the Mass Market, 3 Computer L.J. 211, 214 (1982); Raysman & Brown,
Protection of Confidential Data, N.Y.L.J., Oct. 11, 1983, at 1, col. 1; Technologies
for the 80's, Bus. Wk., July 6, 1981, at 48, col. 1; Hungry for Capital to Sustain the
Boom, Bus. Wk., June 1, 1981, at 78, col. 2.
2. See Biotech Comes of Age, Bus. Wk., Jan. 23, 1984, at 84, col. 1; Technolo-
gies for the 80's, Bus. Wk., July 6, 1981, at 52, col. 1.
3. See Practising Law Institute, Telecommunications Common Carriers in a
Competitive Era 27 (1983); Hungry for Capital to Sustain the Boom, Bus. Wk., June
1, 1981, at 78, col. 1.
4. See Whitebook & Tosi, Protecting Computerland's Fragile New Trade Se-
crets, Cal. Law., Oct. 1982, at 43-44; Technologies for the 80's, Bus. Wk., July 6,
1981, at 48, 48; Hungry for Capital to Sustain the Boom, Bus. Wk., June 1, 1981, at
74, 78, col. 2.
5. Hutter, Pursuing Ex-Employees Who Misappropriate Trade Secrets: Pre-
Trial Considerations, Litigation, Spring 1980, at 39 [hereinafter cited as Hutter I];
Hutter, Trade Secret Misappropriation: A Lawyer's Practical Approach to the Case
Law, 1 W. New Eng. L. Rev. 1, 2-3 (1978) [hereinafter cited as Hutter II]; Levitin,
Trade Secret Piracy, 14 Clev.-Mar. L. Rev. 157, 158-59 (1965); Robison, The Confi-
dence Game: An Approach to the Law About Trade Secrets, 25 Ariz. L. Rev. 347,
347-48 (1983); Developments in the Law-Competitive Torts, 77 Harv. L. Rev. 888,
950-53 (1964); Raysman & Brown, supra note 1, at 1-2.
6. Eighth Annual Judicial Conference of the Court of Customs and Patent
Appeals, 92 F.R.D. 183, 274 (1981) (Patent and Trademark Breakout Session) (re-
marks of Roger M. Milgrim); see Hofer, Business Warfare Over Trade Secrets,
Litigation, Summer 1983, at 8; Whitebook & Tosi, supra note 4, at 44; Hungry for
Capital to Sustain the Boom, Bus. Wk., June 1, 1981, at 74, at col. 1.
7. See Hutter II, supra note 5, at 2; Hungry for Capital to Sustain the Boom,
Bus. Wk., June 1, 1981, at 74, col. 2.
8. See Norman, Another Biotechnology Company Bites the Dust, 217 Science
1016 (1982); Hungry for Capital to Sustain the Boom, Bus. Wk., June 1, 1981, at 74,
col. 2.
9. Hutter II, supra note 5, at 2 & n.1; Levitin, supra note 5, at 158; Maruch-
nics, Industrial Trade Secrets, Their Use and Protection, 4 Clev.-Mar. L. Rev. 69, 69
(1955); Wolk, Some Legal Aspects of Industrial Espionage, Prac. Law., Apr. 1963,
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trade secrets is common.' 0 Such misappropriation costs American
businesses billions of dollars annually" and contravenes the public's
interest in encouraging research and innovation by reducing incen-
tives to develop new technology. 12
The first, and often determinative, step in protecting against unau-
thorized disclosure or use of trade secrets is to seek the issuance of a
preliminary injunction. 13 One of the key determinations in the issu-
ance of such an injunction is whether the plaintiff will suffer irrepara-
ble harm in the absence of equitable relief. 14 Unfortunately, however,
few guidelines exist in making this determination, and the cases are
irreconcilable and unpredictable. A close review of the cases reveals
that disagreement over the basis of liability may be the source of much
of the problem.15
at 87; Raysman & Brown, supra note 1, at 1; see Bender, Trade Secret Protection of
Software, 38 Geo. Wash. L. Rev. 909, 911-12 (1970) [hereinafter cited as Bender I].
10. See Arthurs, Sword in Hand, IBM Stands Watch Over Its Jewels, Legal
Times, Mar. 12, 1984, at 1, 34; Hofer, supra note 6, at 8; Nicholson & Sandza, The
Espionage Boom, Newsweek, July 5, 1982, at 54. The misappropriation generally
results from disclosure or use of secret information by an ex-employee who has gone
to work in a competing enterprise, Harding, Trade Secrets and the Mobile Em-
ployee, 22 Bus. Law. 395, 396 (1967); Developments in the Law-Competitive
Torts, 77 Harv. L. Rev. 888, 950-53 (1964); Note, Industrial Secrets and the Skilled
Employee, 38 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 324, 328 (1963) [hereinafter cited as Industrial Se-
crets]; Lewin, Putting a Lid on Corporate Secrets, N.Y. Times, Apr. 1, 1984, § 3, at
1, col. 2, at 30, col. 1; see 12 R. Milgrim, Business Organizations § 5.04[3], at 5-103
(1983), or from some type of industrial espionage, see 12 R. Milgrim, supra, § 5.05,
at 5-123; Bartenstein, Research Espionage: A Threat to Our National Security, 17
Food Drug Cosm. L.J. 813, 818-19 (1962); Hofer, supra note 6, at 9; Wolk, supra
note 9, at 88; Comment, Corporate Privacy: A Remedy for the Victim of Industrial
Espionage, 1971 Duke L.J. 391, 394-95; Industrial Secrets, supra, at 326.
11. Hoter, supra note 6, at 8; Hutter II, supra note 5, at 3; Comment, Industrial
Espionage: Piracy of Secret Scientific and Technical Information, 14 UCLA L. Rev.
911, 911 (1967) [hereinafter cited as Industrial Espionage].
12. Bender I, supra note 9, at 910; Industrial Espionage, supra note 11, at 913.
13. See E. Kintner & J. Lahr, An Intellectual Property Law Primer 240 (2d ed.
1982); Hutter I, supra note 5, at 39.
14. Ecolaire Inc. v. Crissman, 542 F. Supp. 196, 204 (E.D. Pa. 1982); System
Concepts, Inc. v. Dixon, 669 P.2d 421, 427 (Utah 1983); 11 C. Wright & A. Miller,
Federal Practice and Procedure § 2948, at 430 (1973). Although courts employ
different standards in granting preliminary injunctions, it is universally recognized
that the plaintiff must demonstrate irreparable harm. See, e.g., Syntex Ophthalmics,
Inc. v. Tsuetaki, 701 F.2d 677, 681 (7th Cir. 1983); FMC Corp. v. Varco Int'l, Inc.,
677 F.2d 500, 502 (5th Cir. 1982); SK&F, Co. v. Premo Pharmaceutical Laborato-
ries, Inc., 625 F.2d 1055, 1066 (3d Cir. 1980); Jackson Dairy, Inc. v. H.P. Hood &
Sons, Inc., 596 F.2d 70, 72 (2d Cir. 1979); Dakota Wholesale Liquor, Inc. v.
Minnesota, 584 F.2d 847, 848 (8th Cir. 1978); Washington Metropolitan Area Tran-
sit Comm'n v. Holiday Tours, Inc., 559 F.2d 841, 844 (D.C. Cir. 1977); William
Inglis & Sons Baking Co. v. ITT Continental Baking Co., 526 F.2d 86, 87 (9th Cir.
1975).
15. See infra notes 71-80 and accompanying text.
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Part I of this Note defines the concept of trade secret and compares
the two competing theories of liability: the property theory and the
confidential relation theory. Part II discusses the nature of prelimi-
nary injunctions and irreparable harm, both in general and in trade
secret cases. Finally, this Note examines the types of injuries that are
likely to occur in trade secret cases and the factors that bear on their
irreparability.
I. THE SCOPE OF TRADE SECRET PROTECTION
The Restatement of Torts defines a trade secret as:
any formula, pattern, device or compilation of information which
is used in one's business, and which gives him an opportunity to
obtain an advantage over competitors who do not know or use it. It
may be a formula for a chemical compound, a process of manufac-
turing, treating or preserving materials, a pattern for a machine or
other device, or a list of customers. 16
The language of the Restatement suggests several things about the
nature of trade secrets. First, it appears that any type17 of business
information,' 8 including ideas,'9 can be the subject of a trade secret.
16. Restatement of Torts § 757 comment b (1939). The second Restatement
eliminated this provision because the law of unfair competition had developed to the
extent that it should be treated separately from the law of torts. Restatement (Sec-
ond) of Torts, Introductory Note to Division Nine (1979). This definition, however, is
still widely accepted. See infra note 23 and accompanying text.
17. Smith v. Dravo Corp., 203 F.2d 369, 373 (7th Cir. 1953) ("[A]Imost any
knowledge or information used in the conduct of one's business may be held by its
possessor in secret."); see Syntex Ophthalmics, Inc. v. Tsuetaki, 701 F.2d 677, 683
(7th Cir. 1983) (exact definition of trade secret is not possible); Lear Siegler, Inc. v.
Ark-Ell Springs, Inc., 569 F.2d 286, 288-89 (5th Cir. 1978) (trade secret is elusive
concept); American Can Co. v. Mansukhani, 216 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 1094, 1099 (E.D.
Wis. 1982) (exact definition of trade secret is not possible); Rohm & Haas Co. v.
Adco Chem. Co., 213 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 723, 751 (D.N.J. 1981) (trade secret cases "are
not marked by any discernable consistency"), rev'd on other grounds, 689 F.2d 424
(3d Cir. 1982); Anaconda Co. v. Metric Tool & Die Co., 485 F. Supp. 410, 421 (E.D.
Pa. 1980) (law provides no precise definition of trade secret); ILG Indus. v. Scott, 49
Ill. 2d 88, 92, 273 N.E.2d 393, 395 (1971) ("A definition of the possible objects of
trade secrecy is undoubtedly subject to variations and change as the facts of any
particular case might dictate."); Restatement of Torts § 757 comment b (1939) ("An
exact definition of a trade secret is not possible."); 2 R. Callman, Unfair Competi-
tion, Trademarks & Monopolies § 14.06, at 35 (4th ed. 1981) ("Almost any subject
matter can be claimed to be a trade secret.").
18: Smith v. Dravo Corp., 203 F.2d 369, 373 (7th Cir. 1953); 12 R. Milgrim,
supra note 10, § 2.02, at 2-13.
19. See Belt v. Hamilton Nat'l Bank, 108 F. Supp. 689, 691 (D.D.C. 1952), aff'd,
210 F.2d 706 (D.C. Cir. 1953); Downey v. General Foods Corp., 31 N.Y.2d 56, 61,
286 N.E.2d 257, 259, 334 N.Y.S.2d 874, 877 (1972); Libott, Round the Prickly Pear:
The Idea-Expression Fallacy in a Mass Communications World, 14 UCLA L. Rev.
735, 762 (1967). In fact, trade secret law may be the only way to protect ideas. The
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Second, the information must be secret; matters of public or general
knowledge are not protected.2 0 Finally, the information must be
used2 l1 for business purposes and must provide a competitive advan-
tage22 to the owner of the trade secret.
The overwhelming majority of courts employ the Restatement defi-
nition.2 3 No systematic guidelines, however, have been developed by
Copyright Act affords protection only to "original works of authorship fixed in ...
tangible [media] of expression," 17 U.S.C. § 102(a) (1982), and expressly denies
protection to ideas embodied in protected works, id. § 102(b). The Patent Act does
not expressly deny protection to ideas, but the requirement that an invention be
reduced to practice in order to be patentable, 35 U.S.C. § 102(g) (1976), effects the
same result.
20. Kewanee Oil Co. v. Bicron Corp., 416 U.S. 470, 475 (1974); Carson Prods.
Co. v. Califano, 594 F.2d 453, 461 (5th Cir. 1979); Clark v. Bunker, 453 F.2d 1006,
1009 (9th Cir. 1972); Sheridan v. Mallinckrodt, Inc., 568 F. Supp. 1347, 1352
(N.D.N.Y. 1983); Ecolaire Inc. v. Crissman, 542 F. Supp. 196, 205-06 (E.D. Pa.
1982); In re Arthur Treacher's Franchisee Litig., 537 F. Supp. 311, 321 (E.D. Pa.
1982); American Can Co. v. Mansukhani, 216 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 1094, 1099 (E.D.
Wis. 1982); Eaton Corp. v. Appliance Valves Corp., 526 F. Supp. 1172, 1179 (N.D.
Ind. 1981); Neil & Spencer Holdings Ltd. v. Kleen-Rite, Inc., 479 F. Supp. 164, 169
(E.D. Mo. 1979); Restatement of Torts § 757 comment b (1939); 12 R. Milgrim,
supra note 10, §§ 2.03, 2.07[1]. Generally, absolute secrecy is not required, Henry
Hope X-Ray Prods., Inc. v. Marron Carrel, Inc., 674 F.2d 1336, 1340 (9th Cir.
1982); Sheridan v. Mallinckrodt, Inc., 568 F. Supp. 1347, 1352 (N.D.N.Y. 1983),
and thus, an employer can disclose information to its employees without losing
protection, Anaconda Co. v. Metric Tool & Die Co., 485 F. Supp. 410, 421-22 (E.D.
Pa. 1980); Restatement of Torts § 757 comment b (1939); see 2 R. Callman, supra
note 17, § 14.11, at 52; 12 R. Milgrim, supra note 10, § 2.07[2].
21. Courts differ in the way they define the term "use." As a means of assuring
that the information does in fact lend competitive advantage, some courts limit the
term to actual use by the plaintiff, and deny protection to secret information derived
from unsuccessful experimentation or to information that the plaintiff cannot pres-
ently exploit. See Hurst v. Hughes Tool Co., 634 F.2d 895, 899-900 (5th Cir.), cert.
denied, 454 U.S. 829 (1981); Materials Dev. Corp. v. Atlantic Advanced Metals,
Inc., 172 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 595, 606 (Mass. Super. Ct. 1971). Yet, this type of
information may in fact be of some value by saving the plaintiff time and money, and
many courts will afford protection in such cases. 12 R. Milgrim, supra note 10,
§ 2.0211], at 2-15; e.g., Syntex Ophthalmics, Inc. v. Tsuetaki, 701 F.2d 677, 683 (7th
Cir. 1983); Standard Brands, Inc. v. Zumpe, 264 F. Supp. 254, 260 (E.D. La. 1967);
Harris Mfg. Co. v. Williams, 157 F. Supp. 779, 787-88 (W.D. Ark. 1957); Affiliated
Hosp. Prods., Inc. v. Baldwin, 57 Ill. App. 3d 800, 807, 373 N.E.2d 1000, 1006
(1978).
22. E.I. Du Pont De Nemours & Co. v. United States, 288 F.2d 904, 911 (Ct. Cl.
1961); E.W. Bliss Co. v. Struthers-Dunn, 291 F. Supp. 390, 400 (S.D. Iowa 1968),
rev'd on other grounds, 408 F.2d 1108 (8th Cir. 1969); 12 R. Milgrim, supra note 10,
§ 2.09, at 2-96.
23. Kewanee Oil Co. v. Bicron Corp., 416 U.S. 470, 474 (1974); Videotronics,
Inc. v. Bend Elecs., 564 F. Supp. 1471, 1475 (D. Nev. 1983); McAlpine v. AAMCO
Automatic Transmissions, Inc., 461 F. Supp. 1232, 1256 (E.D. Mich. 1978); Drill
Parts & Serv. Co. v. Joy Mfg. Co., 439 So. 2d 43, 48 (Ala. 1983); Gilburne &
Johnston, supra note 1, at 214-15; Hutter II, supra note 5, at 10; see, e.g., Syntex
Ophthalmics, Inc. v. Tsuetaki, 701 F.2d 677, 683 (7th Cir. 1983); Rohm & Haas Co.
1984]
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which courts can determine if information is a trade secret because
trade secret cases vary greatly. 24 Accordingly, the determination
whether information qualifies as a trade secret must be made on a
case-by-case basis.2 5
The protection of rights in secret information originated in Roman
law,26 which protected slave owners against competitors who sought
to entice slaves to divulge the secrets of their masters.2 7 The diminu-
v. Adeo Chem. Co., 689 F.2d 424, 431 (3d Cir. 1982); Henry Hope X-Ray Prods.,
Inc. v. Marron Carrel, Inc., 674 F.2d 1336, 1340 (9th Cir. 1982); Carson Prods. Co.
v. Califano, 594 F.2d 453, 460-61 (5th Cir. 1979); Richter v. Westab, Inc., 529 F.2d
896, 900 n.1 (6th Cir. 1976); Ecolaire Inc. v. Crissman, 542 F. Supp. 196, 205-06
(E.D. Pa. 1982); Eaton Corp. v. Appliance Valves Corp., 526 F. Supp. 1172, 1179
(N.D. Ind. 1981); Rapco Foam, Inc. v. Scientific Applications, Inc., 479 F. Supp.
1027, 1029 (S.D.N.Y. 1979); Pressure Science, Inc. v. Kramer, 413 F. Supp. 618,
625-26 (D. Conn.), aff'd, 551 F.2d 301 (2d Cir. 1976); Morton v. Rogers, 20 Ariz.
App. 581, 584-85, 514 P.2d 752, 755-56 (1973); Basic Chems., Inc. v. Benson, 251
N.W.2d 220, 226 (Iowa 1977); Koch Eng'g Co. v. Faulconer, 227 Kan. 813, 827, 610
P.2d 1094, 1104 (1980); Space Aero Prods. Co. v. R.E. Darling Co., 238 Md. 93,
105, 208 A.2d 74, 79, cert. denied, 382 U.S. 843 (1965); J.T. Healy & Son, Inc. v.
James A. Murphy & Son, Inc., 357 Mass. 728, 736, 260 N.E.2d 723, 729 (1970);
Cherne Indus. v. Grounds & Assocs., 278 N.W.2d 81, 89-90 (Minn. 1979); National
Rejectors, Inc. v. Trieman, 409 S.W.2d 1, 18-19 (Mo. 1966); Henkle & Joyce
Hardware Co. v. Maco, Inc., 195 Neb. 565, 570-72, 239 N.W.2d 772, 775-77 (1976);
Van Prods. Co. v. General Welding & Fabricating Co., 419 Pa. 248, 258-59, 213
A.2d 769, 775 (1965); Lowndes Prods., Inc. v. Brower, 259 S.C. 322, 327, 191
S.E.2d 761, 764 (1972); Mid-America Mktg. Corp. v. Dakota Indus., 281 N.W.2d
419, 423 (S.D. 1979), af'd on rehearing, 289 N.W.2d 797 (1980); Corroon & Black-
Rutters & Roberts, Inc. v. Hosch, 109 Wis. 2d 290, 295, 325 N.W.2d 883, 886
(1982).
24. See supra note 17 and accompanying text.
25. The Restatement lists six factors which are to be used in determining whether
information is a trade secret:
(1) the extent to which the information is known outside of [the plaintiff's]
business; (2) the extent to which it is known by employees and others
involved in [the plaintiff's] business; (3) the extent of measures taken by him
to guard the secrecy of the information; (4) the value of the information to
him and to his competitors; (5) the amount of effort or money expended by
him in developing the information; (6) the ease or difficulty with which the
information could be properly acquired or duplicated by others.
Restatement of Torts § 757 comment b (1939). These factors have been cited with
approval by many courts. E.g., Syntex Ophthalmics, Inc. v. Tsuetaki, 701 F.2d 677,
683 (7th Cir. 1983); Carson Prods. Co. v. Califano, 594 F.2d 453, 461 (5th Cir.
1979); Forest Laboratories, Inc. v. Pillsbury Co., 452 F.2d 621, 624 (7th Cir. 1971);
Videotronics, Inc. v. Bend Elecs., 564 F. Supp. 1471, 1475 (D. Nev. 1983); Neil &
Spencer Holdings Ltd. v. Kleen-Rite, Inc., 479 F. Supp. 164, 169 (E.D. Mo. 1979);
Pressure Science, Inc. v. Kramer, 413 F. Supp. 618, 626 (D. Conn.), af'd, 551 F.2d
301 (2d Cir. 1976); Wilson Certified Foods, Inc. v. Fairbury Food Prods., Inc., 370
F. Supp. 1081, 1083 (D. Neb. 1974); Motorola, Inc. v. Fairchild Camera & Instru-
ment Corp., 366 F. Supp. 1173, 1184 (D. Ariz. 1973).
26. See E. Kintner & J. Lahr, supra note 13, at 129-30; Schiller, Trade Secrets
and the Roman Law; The Actio Servi Corrupti, 30 Colum. L. Rev. 837, 838 (1930).
27. See E. Kintner & J. Lahr, supra note 13, at 129-30; Schiller, supra note 26, at
838-39.
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tion in value of the slave, who was considered the master's property,
was the basis for relief. 28 Today, the basis of liability for misappropri-
ation of a trade secret is the subject of debate.29 Early American
decisions on the issue framed trade secret protection in terms of pro-
tectible property rights, 30 and this view remains widely accepted. 31
Consequently, trade secrets can be assigned 32 or licensed, 33 form the
res of a trust 34 or pass to a trustee in bankruptcy.
35
28. See E. Kintner & J. Lahr, supra note 13, at 130; Schiller, supra note 26, at
839.
29. See 2 R. Callman, supra note 17, §14.01, at 2; R. Ellis, Trade Secrets § 6, at
11-13 (1953); E. Kintner & J. Lahr, supra note 13, at 206; H. Nims, Unfair Competi-
tion & Trademarks § 141, at 405 (4th ed. 1947); A. Turner, The Law of Trade
Secrets § 3 at 12 (1962).
30. See, e.g., Peabody v. Norfolk, 98 Mass. 452, 459-60 (1868); 0. & W. Thum
Co. v. Tloczynski, 114 Mich. 149, 153, 72 N.W. 140, 141 (1897); Salomon v. Hertz,
40 N.J. Eq. 400, 402, 2 A. 379, 380-81 (1886); Tabor v. Hoffman, 118 N.Y. 30, 34,
23 N.E. 12, 12 (1889); Cincinnati Bell Co. v. Dodds, 10 Ohio Dec. Reprint 154, 155
(1887).
31. See, e.g., Scharmer v. Carrollton Mfg. Co., 525 F.2d 95, 99 (6th Cir. 1975);
Underwater Storage, Inc. v. United States Rubber Co., 371 F.2d 950, 954 (D.C. Cir.
1966), cert. denied, 386 U.S. 911 (1967); Formulabs, Inc. v. Hartley Pen Co., 275
F.2d 52, 56-57 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 363 U.S. 830 (1960); Ferroline Corp. v.
General Aniline & Film Corp., 207 F.2d 912, 922 (7th Cir. 1953), cert. denied, 347
U.S. 953 (1954); Aktiebolaget Bofors v. United States, 194 F.2d 145, 147 (D.C. Cir.
1951); Monsanto Co. v. Acting Adm'r, United States EPA, 564 F. Supp. 552, 565-66
(E.D. Mo. 1983), appeal argued, 52 U.S.L.W. 3649 (U.S. Mar. 6, 1984) (No. 83-
196); Zotos Int'l, Inc. v. Kennedy, 460 F. Supp. 268, 272 (D.D.C. 1978); Coin-
Share, Inc. v. Computer Complex, Inc., 338 F. Supp. 1229, 1238 (E.D. Mich. 1971),
aff'd, 458 F.2d 1341 (6th Cir. 1972); In re Bettinger Corp., 197 F. Supp. 273, 276-77
(D. Mass. 1961); Farrand Optical Co. v. United States, 175 F. Supp. 230, 249
(S.D.N.Y. 1959); Microbiological Research Corp. v. Muna, 625 P.2d 690, 696 (Utah
1981).
32. Painton & Co. v. Bourns, Inc., 442 F.2d 216, 225 (2d Cir. 1971); Chadwick
v. Covell, 151 Mass. 190, 191, 23 N.E. 1068, 1069 (1890); McClary v. Hubbard, 97
Vt. 222, 229, 122 A. 469, 472 (1923); see Heltra, Inc. v. Richen-Gemco, Inc., 395 F.
Supp. 346, 351-52 (D.S.C. 1975), rev'd on other grounds, 540 F.2d 1235 (4th Cir.
1976); 12 R. Milgrim, supra note 10, § 1.02, at 1-14.
The Internal Revenue Service recognizes trade secrets as property, and therefore, a
transfer of a trade secret is treated as a sale under 26 U.S.C. § 351 (1976). Rev. Rul.
64-56, 1964-1 C.B. 133, 134 ("The term 'property' for purposes of section 351 of the
Code will be held to include anything qualifying as 'secret processes and formu-
las.' "); see E.I. Du Pont De Nemours & Co. v. United States, 288 F.2d 904, 910, 912
(Ct. Cl. 1961); see also Nelson v. Commissioner, 203 F.2d 1, 6 (6th Cir. 1953)
(transfer of secret process in exchange for cash constitutes sale); In re Estate of
Brandreth, 28 Misc. 468, 473, 59 N.Y.S. 1092, 1096 (1899) (value of corporate shares
includes value of secret recipes), rev'd on other grounds, 55 A.D. 575, 69 N.Y.S. 142
(1901), rev'd, 169 N.Y. 437, 62 N.E. 563 (1902).
33. Painton & Co. v. Bourns, Inc., 442 F.2d 216, 225 (2d Cir. 1971); see Aronson
v. Quick Point Pencil Co., 440 U.S. 257, 262-63 (1979); N.V. Maatschappij Voor
Indus. Waarden v. A.O. Smith Corp., 590 F.2d 415, 416 (2d Cir. 1978); Formulabs,
Inc. v. Hartley Pen Co., 275 F.2d 52, 53 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 363 U.S. 830
(1960).
34. Green v. Folgham, 57 Eng. Rep. 159, 162 (1823); Restatement (Second) of
Trusts § 82(e) (1959); see Sketchley v. Lipkin, 99 Cal. App. 2d 849, 857, 222 P.2d
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Many authorities, however, reject the property view as the basis of
liability in trade secret cases. Some merely state that trade secrets
cannot be characterized as property.3 6 Most, however, maintain that
trade secret law protects against breaches of confidential relation-
ships,37 or suggest that "while a trade secret is clearly a property right,
927, 933 (2d Dist. 1950); Warwick v. DeMayo, 358 Mo. 130, 136-37, 213 S.W.2d
392, 395 (1948).
35. Scharmer v. Carrollton Mfg. Co., 178 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 335, 336 (N.D. Ohio
1973), afJ'd, 525 F.2d 95 (6th Cir. 1975); see Varo, Inc. v. Corbin Mfg. Co., 50
F.R.D. 376, 377 (E.D. Pa. 1970); cf. State Bank v. Rendispos Corp., 173 U.S.P.Q.
(BNA) 136, 137, 139 (S.D. Ill. 1971) (bank acting as assignee of insolvent corpora-
tion); In re Bettinger Corp., 197 F. Supp. 273, 276-77 (D. Mass. 1961) (asset
remained in control of court).
36. W. Walsh, A Treatise on Equity § 45, at 226 (1930) (the term "property" is
not applicable to trade secrets); Stedman, Trade Secrets, 23 Ohio St. L.J. 4, 21
(1962) ("It is, indeed, a strange form of 'property' that disappears when the informa-
tion it embraces becomes public."); Developments in the Law-Competitive Torts,
77 Harv. L. Rev. 888, 935-36 (1964) ("The word property has too many inappro-
priate connotations to be anything but misleading in the misappropriation analy-
sis."); see Northern Petrochem. Co. v. Tomlinson, 484 F.2d 1057, 1060 (7th Cir.
1973) (tort law, not property law, is the basis for a trade secret misappropriation
action); Winston Research Corp. v. Minnesota Mining & Mfg. Co., 350 F.2d 134,
138 (9th Cir. 1965) (refusal to recognize protectible interest outside of confidential
relations).
Some commentators are concerned that courts do not easily accept the concept of
intangible property and that recognition of a property theory would thus enable
defendants to avoid liability by arguing that no misappropriation of a trade secret
could occur. R. Ellis, supra note 29, § 6; Note, Equitable Protection of Trade Secrets,
23 Colum. L. Rev. 164, 164 (1923); see Sachs v. Cluett, Peabody & Co., 177 Misc.
695, 698, 31 N.Y.S.2d 718, 721 (1941), rev'd on other grounds, 265 A.D. 497, 39
N.Y.S.2d 853 (1943), afj'd mem., 291 N.Y. 772, 53 N.E.2d 241 (1944).
37. The case most often cited for this view is E.I. Du Pont De Nemours Powder
Co. v. Masland, 244 U.S. 100 (1917), in which Justice Holmes wrote:
The word property as applied to ... trade secrets is an unanalyzed expres-
sion of certain secondary consequences of the primary fact that the law
makes some rudimentary requirements of good faith. Whether the plaintiffs
have any valuable secret or not the defendant knows the facts, whatever
they are, through a special confidence that he accepted. The property may
be denied but the confidence cannot be. Therefore, the starting point ... is
not property ... but that the defendant stood in confidential relations with
the plaintiffs ....
Id. at 102; accord Becher v. Contoure Laboratories, Inc., 279 U.S. 388, 390-91
(1929); Goldberg v. Medtronic, Inc., 686 F.2d 1219, 1223-28 (7th Cir. 1982); Ro-
berts v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 573 F.2d 976, 983-84 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 439
U.S. 860 (1978); Clark v. Bunker, 453 F.2d 1006, 1008 & n.2 (9th Cir. 1972); Water
Servs., Inc. v. Tesco Chems., Inc., 410 F.2d 163, 172 (5th Cir. 1969); W.R. Grace &
Co. v. Hargadine, 392 F.2d 9, 13-14 (6th Cir. 1968); Sperry Rand Corp. v. Elec-
tronic Concepts, Inc., 325 F. Supp. 1209, 1219 (E.D. Va. 1970), vacated and
remanded sub nom. Sperry Rand Corp. v. A-T-O, Inc., 447 F.2d 1387 (4th Cir.
1971), cert. denied, 405 U.S. 1017, 409 U.S. 892 (1972); Heyman v. AR. Winarick,
Inc., 207 F. Supp. 78, 83 (S.D.N.Y. 1962), aff'd, 325 F.2d 584 (2d Cir. 1963); Plastic
& Metal Fabricators, Inc. v. Roy, 163 Conn. 257, 266-68, 303 A.2d 725, 730-31
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protected from unauthorized use or disclosure, it is the breach of
confidence ... rather than the infringement of a property right,
which is the gravamen of trade secret cases." 38
This controversy- is not purely academic: The basis of liability may
have an impact on the application of the law by shaping the court's
determination of whether a trade secret has been misappropriated.
For example, under the confidential relation theory, a former em-
ployee will not be enjoined from divulging his past employer's trade
secrets unless it can be shown that the secrets were imparted under a
cloak of confidentiality. 39 Requiring confidentiality ensures that de-
fendants have received notice that the information is a trade secret. 40
(1972); Materials Dev. Corp. v. Atlantic Advanced Metals, Inc., 172 U.S.P.Q.
(BNA) 595, 605-06 (Mass. Super. Ct. 1971); Furr's Inc. v. United Specialty Advertis-
ing Co., 338 S.W.2d 762, 766 (Tex. Civ. App. 1960); Restatement of Torts § 757
comment b (1939); A. Turner, supra note 29, § 3 (1962).
38. Wilkes v. Pioneer Am. Ins. Co., 383 F. Supp. 1135, 1140 (D.S.C. 1974)
(citations omitted); accord Servo Corp. of Am. v. General Elec. Co., 393 F.2d 551,
555 (4th Cir. 1968); see Franke v. Wiltschek, 209 F.2d 493, 495 (2d Cir. 1953);
Standard Brands, Inc. v. Zumpe, 264 F. Supp. 254, 262 & n.14 (E.D. La. 1967).
Some commentators argue that as long as trade secrets are protected, the basis of
liability is immaterial. R. Ellis, supra note 29, § 7, at 13; H. Nims, supra note 29,
§ 141, at 405; Note, Nature of Trade Secrets and Their Protection, 42 Harv. L. Rev.
254, 258 (1928).
39. E.I. Du Pont De Nemours Powder Co. v. Masland, 244 U.S. 100, 102 (1917);
Rohm & Haas Co. v. Adco Chem. Co., 689 F.2d 424, 429 (3d Cir. 1982); Water
Servs., Inc. v. Tesco Chems., Inc., 410 F.2d 163, 172 (5th Cir. 1969); Speedry
Chem. Prods., Inc. v. Carter's Ink Co., 306 F.2d 328, 331 (2d Cir. 1962); B.F.
Cladding & Co. v. Scientific Anglers, Inc., 245 F.2d 722, 728 (6th Cir. 1957); Eaton
Corp. v. Appliance Valves Corp., 526 F. Supp. 1172, 1178 (N.D. Ind. 1981);
Vekamaf Holland B.V. v. Pipe Benders, Inc., 211 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 955, 978 (D.
Minn. 1981); Davis v. General Motors Corp., 196 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 218, 221 (N.D.
Ill. 1977); Keystone Plastics, Inc. v. C & P Plastics, Inc., 340 F. Supp. 55, 73-74
(S.D. Fla. 1972), affd, 506 F.2d 960 (5th Cir. 1975); Future Plastics, Inc. v. Ware
Shoals Plastics, Inc., 340 F. Supp. 1376, 1384 (D.S.C. 1972); Microbiological Re-
search Corp. v. Muna, 625 P.2d 690, 696 (Utah 1981).
40. The Restatement supports this idea by stating that evidence of a confidential
relationship is a means to assure that the defendant "knows or should know that the
information is [the plaintiffs] trade secret." Restatement of Torts § 757 comment i
(1939). The language of the Restatement suggests that express notice is not required,
and thus, any circumstances that might put the defendant on notice that the informa-
tion is confidential will satisfy the requirement. See A.H. Emery Co. v. Marean
Prods. Corp., 389 F.2d 11, 16, (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 393 U.S. 835 (1968); Carter
Prods., Inc. v. Colgate-Palmolive Co., 130 F. Supp. 557, 573 (D. Md. 1955), aff'd,
230 F.2d 855 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 352 U.S. 843 (1956). Recognizing this, courts
may find that the defendant has received constructive notice and thus has an implied
duty not to disclose. Uniservices, Inc. v. Dudenhoffer, 517 F.2d 492, 497 (7th Cir.
1975); Smith v. Dravo Corp., 203 F.2d 369, 376-77 (7th Cir. 1953); Stanley Aviation
Corp. v. United States, 196 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 612, 621-22 (D. Colo. 1977) (dictum);
Allen-Qualley Co. v. Shellmar Prods. Co., 31 F.2d 293, 296 (N.D. Ill.), afJ'd, 36
F.2d 623 (7th Cir. 1929); Junker v. Plummer, 320 Mass. 76, 80-81, 67 N.E.2d 667,
670 (1946); Aronson v. Orlov, 228 Mass. 1, 4-5, 116 N.E. 951, 952 (1917), cert.
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If a property theory were employed, however, the disclosure of infor-
mation from employer to employee would give rise to an implied
confidential relationship. 41 Thus, the defendant would be presumed
to have received notice.42
The confidential relation theory is ill-suited to achieve the modern
goals of trade secret protection. For example, the Restatement, which
incorporates the confidential relation theory, 43 distinguishes patent
law from the law of trade secrets by stating that a trade secret:
may be a device or process which is patentable; but it need not be
that. It may be a device or process which is clearly anticipated in
the prior art or one which is merely a mechanical improvement
that a good mechanic can make. Novelty and invention are not
requisite for a trade secret as they are for patentability. 44
denied, 245 U.S. 662 (1918); Maas & Waldstein Co. v. Walker, 100 N.J. Eq. 224,
230-32, 135 A. 275, 278-79 (1926), aff'd mem., 102 N.J. Eq. 328, 140 A. 921 (1928);
Stone v. Goss, 65 N.J. Eq. 756, 759, 55 A. 736, 737 (1903); Kaumagraph Co. v.
Stampagraph Co., 235 N.Y. 1, 6, 138 N.E. 485, 486 (1923).
41. See Uniservices, Inc. v. Dudenhoffer, 517 F.2d 492, 496-97 (7th Cir. 1975);
Smith v. Dravo Corp., 203 F.2d 369, 376-77 (7th Cir. 1953); Stanley Aviation Corp.
v. United States, 196 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 612, 621-22 (D. Colo. 1977); Allen-Qualley
Co. v. Shellmar Prods. Co., 31 F.2d 293, 296 (N.D. Ill.), af-'d, 36 F.2d 623 (7th Cir.
1929); Junker v. Plummer, 320 Mass. 76, 80-81, 67 N.E.2d 667, 670 (1946); Aronson
v. Orlov, 228 Mass. 1, 5, 116 N.E. 951, 952 (1917), cert. denied, 245 U.S. 662 (1918);
Maas & Waldstein Co. v. Walker, 100 N.J. Eq. 224, 230-32, 135 A. 275, 278-79
(1926), affd mem., 102 N.J. Eq. 328, 140 A. 921 (1928); Stone v. Goss, 65 N.J. Eq.
756, 759, 55 A. 736, 737 (1903); Kaumagraph Co. v. Stampagraph Co., 235 N.Y. 1,
7-8, 138 N.E. 485, 487 (1923).
42. In Wexler v. Greenberg, 399 Pa. 569, 160 A.2d 430 (1960), the court found
that disclosure by the employer to the employee of a pre-existing trade secret is the
very thing that gives rise to the implied pledge of confidence, but noted that the same
is not true for secrets that are given to the employer by the employee. Id. at 577, 160
A.2d at 434. It may appear that this rule does not differ from the rule adopted by the
Restatement and its adherents, which allows for the implication of a confidential
relation from the circumstances of the case. Recognition of a rule similar to that
espoused in Wexler, however, would ease the evidentiary burden imposed on plain-
tiffs by requiring only evidence of disclosure of a trade secret, rather than evidence of
diclosure and of the confidential context of disclosure.
43. Restatement of Torts § 757(b) & comment j (1939).
44. Restatement of Torts § 757 comment b (1939). Thus, many courts have held
that novelty and prior art are irrelevant in trade secret cases. See, e.g., Cataphote
Corp. v. Hudson, 422 F.2d 1290, 1293 (5th Cir. 1970); Water Servs., Inc. v. Tesco
Chems., Inc., 410 F.2d 163, 172-73 (5th Cir. 1969); A.O. Smith Corp. v. Petroleum
Iron Works Co., 73 F.2d 531, 538 (6th Cir. 1934); State Bank v. Rendispos Corp.,
173 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 136, 139 (S.D. Il. 1971); E.W. Bliss Co. v. Struthers-Dunn,
Inc. 291 F. Supp. 390, 400 (S.D. Iowa 1968), rev'd on other grounds, 408 F.2d 1108,
1112 (8th Cir. 1969); Allis-Chalmers Mfg. Co. v. Continental Aviation & Eng'g
Corp., 255 F. Supp. 645, 653 (E.D. Mich. 1966); Head Ski Co. v. Kam Ski Co., 158
F. Supp. 919, 923 (D. Md. 1958); Choisser Research Corp. v. Electronic Vision
Corp., 173 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 234, 235 (Cal. App. Dep't Super. Ct. 1972); Sun Dial
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Corp. v. Rideout, 29 N.J. Super. 361, 366, 102 A.2d 90, 92-93, aff'd, 16 N.J. 252,
108 A.2d 442 (1954).
Other courts, however, have concluded that some novelty is required, although a
trade secret need not be patentable to be afforded protection. See, e.g., Rohm &
Haas Co. v. Adco Chem. Co., 689 F.2d 424, 431 (3d Cir. 1982); FMC Corp. v.
Varco Int'l, Inc., 677 F.2d 500, 502 (5th Cir. 1982); Timely Prods. Corp. v. Arron,
523 F.2d 288, 303-04 (2d Cir. 1975); University Computing Co. v. Lykes-Youngs-
town Corp., 504 F.2d 518, 535 n.25 (5th Cir. 1974); Kodekey Elecs., Inc. v.
Mechanex Corp., 486 F.2d 449, 455 (10th Cir. 1973); Sperry Rand Corp. v. A-T-O,
Inc., 447 F.2d 1387, 1391 (4th Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 405 U.S. 1017, 409 U.S. 892
(1972). The novelty provisions of the Patent Act grant protection only to the first to
conceive of an idea and reduce it to practice. 35 U.S.C. § 102 (1976).
Under trade secret law, the concept of novelty is closely related to that of secrecy. 1
P. Rosenberg, Patent Law Fundamentals § 3.03, at 3-11, 3-12 (1983); Developments
in the Law-Competitive Torts, 77 Harv. L. Rev. 888, 949-50 (1964). Information
that is generally known to the public or throughout an industry cannot be secret, see
supra note 20, and therefore cannot be novel, see In re Arthur Treacher's Franchisee
Litig., 537 F. Supp. 311, 321 (E.D. Pa. 1982); 12 R. Milgrim, supra note 10, § 2.08,
at 2-84; 1 P. Rosenberg, supra, § 3.03, at 3-11 to 3-12. Because a trade secret need
not be absolutely secret to be afforded protection, however, see supra note 20,
subsequent independent development of similar information will not necessarily
destroy its novelty. See E.I. Du Pont De Nemours & Co. v. United States, 288 F.2d
904, 911 (Ct. Cl. 1961); In re Arthur Treacher's Franchisee Litig., 537 F. Supp. 311,
321 (E.D. Pa. 1982); Ultra-Life Labs., Inc. v. Eames, 240 Mo. App. 851, 867, 221
S.W.2d 224, 233 (Mo. 1949).
Although novelty and secrecy are related, the two requirements remain distinct.
The secrecy requirement is subjective, Bender, Trade Secret Software Protection, 5
Am. Pat. L.A.Q. 49, 51 [hereinafter cited as Bender II], and most courts require only
that reasonable precautions be taken against disclosure of information. E.I. duPont
deNemours & Co. v. Christopher, 431 F.2d 1012, 1015-16 (5th Cir. 1970), cert.
denied, 400 U.S. 1024 (1971); CPG Prods. Corp. v. Mego Corp., 214 U.S.P.Q.
(BNA) 206, 213 (S.D. Ohio 1981); Anaconda Co. v. Metric Tool & Die Co., 485 F.
Supp. 410, 422 (E.D. Pa. 1980); Structural Dynamics Research Corp. v. Engineering
Mechanics Research Corp., 401 F. Supp. 1102, 1117 (E.D. Mich. 1975); Greenberg
v. Croydon Plastics Co., 378 F. Supp. 806, 812 (E.D. Pa. 1974). Evidence of these
precautions demonstrates that defendants are on notice that the information is a
trade secret, see Structural Dynamics Research Corp. v. Engineering Mechanics
Research Corp., 401 F. Supp. 1102, 1117 (E.D. Mich. 1975); Dynamics Research
Corp. v. Analytic Sciences Corp., 9 Mass. App. 254, 276-77, 400 N.E.2d 1274, 1287
(1980); Restatement of Torts § 757 comment j (1939); see supra note 42, and may
provide circumstantial evidence that the information is valuable to its owner, see 2
R. Callman, supra note 17, § 14.11, at 50; Hutter II, supra note 5, at 20-21. Thus,
novelty under trade secret law is a relative concept-its existence is a function of the
number of parties that have access to the information. 12 R. Milgrim, supra note 10,
§ 2.07[2], at 2-80; Bender II, supra, at 51. Unfortunately, there are no standards for
determining how widely the information must be disseminated before its novelty will
be destroyed.
The concept of novelty also subsumes some degree of innovation or originality.
Thus, to be novel, information should represent some advance over prior art. See,
e.g., Rohm & Haas Co. v. Adco Chem. Co., 689 F.2d 424, 433 (3d Cir. 1982)
(combination process that produces a superior result is protectible as a trade secret);
Sikes v. McGraw-Edison Co., 665 F.2d 731, 735-36 (5th Cir.) (although idea under-
lying trade secret was well known in the trade, plaintiff's product had unique
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Accordingly, the protection against breach of faith afforded under the
confidential relation theory "is not based on a policy of rewarding or
otherwise encouraging the development of secret processes or de-
vices. '4- In Kewanee Oil Co. v. Bicron Corp. ,46 however, the Su-
preme Court stated that "secrecy, in the context of trade secrets, . . .
implies at least minimal novelty"47 and that encouragement of inven-
tion is a major policy underlying trade secret law.48
Furthermore, the property theory is better suited to protect trade
secrets in cases in which the parties are not in a trust relationship, as
when a corporation appropriates secret information from one of its
competitors. 49 This type of situation arises with increasing frequency
combination of features and thus constituted trade secret), cert. denied, 458 U.S.
1108 (1982); Cataphote Corp. v. Hudson, 444 F.2d 1313, 1315 (5th Cir. 1971) (idea
must have at least a "modicum of originality" to be a trade secret); Davies v.
Carnation Co., 352 F.2d 393, 396 (9th Cir. 1965) (mere idea without novelty is not a
property right to which one can claim exclusive ownership); Boop v. Ford Motor
Co., 278 F.2d 197, 199 (7th Cir. 1960) (same); CPG Prods. Corp. v. Mego Corp.,
502 F. Supp. 42, 44 (S.D. Ohio 1980) (combination of equipment to manufacture a
new article is a trade secret); Anaconda Co. v. Metric Tool & Die Co., 485 F. Supp.
410, 418, 422 (E.D. Pa. 1980) (unique combination of generally known, individual
parts of a machine is a trade secret); Cybertek Computer Prods., Inc. v. Whitfield,
203 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 1020, 1024 (Cal. Super. Ct. 1977) (same); Ferranti Elec., Inc.
v. Harwood, 43 Misc. 2d 533, 538, 251 N.Y.S.2d 612, 617 (Sup. Ct. 1964) ("[R]efine-
ments [that] do not possess that special characteristic which represents a substantial,
novel, important or significant improvement" do not create a trade secret.).
45. Restatement of Torts § 757 comment b (1939).
46. 416 U.S. 470 (1974).
47. Id. at 476.
48. Id. at 481-82; accord Aronson v. Quick Point Pencil Co., 440 U.S. 257, 265-
66 (1979) (citing Kewanee with approval); Fowle v. Park, 131 U.S. 88, 97 (1889)
(trade secret policy is to "encourage useful discoveries by securing their fruits to those
who make them").
49. A representative example of such a case is E.I. duPont deNemours & Co. v.
Christopher, 431 F.2d 1012 (5th Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 1024 (1971), in
which plaintiff alleged that by taking aerial photographs of a partially-constructed
processing plant, the defendant was able to appropriate the plaintiff's trade secrets.
Id. at 1013. The Christopher court concluded that liability need not be based on the
existence of a confidential relationship between the parties, and held that the plain-
tiff had a valid claim. The court relied on the language of Restatement § 757(a), id.
at 1014-16; accord Drill Parts & Serv. Co. v. Joy Mfg. Co., 439 So. 2d 43, 49 (Ala.
1983), which imposes liability on actors that employ improper means to obtain trade
secrets, Restatement of Torts § 757(a) (1939). In so holding, the Christopher court
formulated an eleventh commandment in the area of commercial improprieties:
"[T]hou shall not appropriate a trade secret through deviousness .... " 431 F.2d at
1017. Thus, arguably the Restatement can be read to afford protection in cases in
which no confidential relation exists. Not all courts, however, interpret the Restate-
ment so broadly. Many courts have explicitly stated that a confidential relation
between the parties must exist before relief will be granted. See supra note 37.
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as technological advances allow physically remote parties to gain
access to secret information. 50
The property theory thus promotes clarity of thought on the true
nature of trade secret protection and achieves the goal of encouraging
research and innovation by easing the plaintiff's burden on the issue of
notice to the defendant, recognizing novelty as a requirement for a
trade secret, and broadening the scope of protection to include cases
involving non-confidential relationships. 51 Moreover, because defend-
ants will still be liable for breaches of confidential relationships under
the law of agency,52 the recognition of the property theory in trade
secret cases will not weaken the protection afforded to plaintiffs.
II. PRELIMINARY INJUNCTIONS IN TRADE SECRET CASES
The primary purpose of a preliminary injunction is to ensure that
the plaintiff will have an adequate final remedy by maintaining the
status quo between the parties during the pendency of the litigation.5 3
In a trade secret case, a preliminary injunction maintains the status
quo by preventing the destruction of the trade secret through public
disclosure of the information during the litigation 4 Moreover, be-
cause the time necessary to litigate the case may exceed the life-span of
the trade secret, 55 preliminary injunctive relief will often be the only
way to ensure the plaintiff has an adequate remedy.
A. Irreparable Harm and Inadequate Remedies at Law
For a court to have equitable jurisdiction, there must be no ade-
quate remedy at law.56 Therefore, to obtain a preliminary injunction,
50. 2 R. Callman, supra note 17, § 14.35, at 138; Hutter II, supra note 5, at 3;
see Lasers Get Into the Eavesdropping Act, Bus. Wk., July 12, 1982, at 76, col. 2;
New 'Bugs' Make Spying Easier, Bus. Wk., July 12, 1982, at 74, col. 1.
51. At least one commentator has suggested that the property theory affords the
broadest protection to trade secrets. Ducker, Liability for Computer Software, 26
Bus. Law. 1081, 1087 (1971).
52. See Eastern Marble Prods. Corp. v. Roman Marble, Inc., 372 Mass. 835,
842, 364 N.E.2d 799, 803 (1977); Vigitron, Inc. v. Ferguson, 120 N.H. 526, 631-32,
419 A.2d 1115, 1119 (1980); Computer Print Sys. v. Lewis, 281 Pa. Super. 240, 252-
53, 422 A.2d 148, 154-55 (1980); Restatement (Second) of Agency §§ 395, 396 (1958).
53. Triebwasser & Katz v. American Tel. & Tel. Co., 535 F.2d 1356, 1360 (2d
Cir. 1976); SCM Corp. v. Xerox Corp., 507 F.2d 358, 361 (2d Cir. 1974); E.W. Bliss
Co. v. Struthers-Dunn, Inc., 291 F. Supp. 390, 400-01 (S.D. Iowa 1968), rev'd on
other grounds, 408 F.2d 1108 (8th Cir. 1969); 1 C. Beach, Commentaries on the Law
of Injunctions § 112 (1895); 1 J. High, Law of Injunctions § 8, at 13 (1905); 1 H.
Joyce, The Law Relating to Injunctions § 41a, at 84 (1909); J. Lewis & T. Spelling,
The Law Governing Injunctions § 18, at 30-31 (1926).
54. Hutter I, supra note 5, at 43.
55. The problem is growing increasingly acute due to the shortened life-span of
technology. See supra note 6.
56. J. Eaton, Handbook of Equity Jurisprudence § 8, at 28 (2d ed. 1923); see I C.
Beach, supra note 53, § 26, at 31; D. Dobbs, Handbook on the Law of Remedies
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the plaintiff must demonstrate that it will suffer irreparable harm in
the absence of such relief.57 In characterizing an injury as irreparable,
a court may58 look to the absence of a measure of damages 9 or the
inability of damages to compensate adequately the injured party.60
The mere existence of a legal remedy does not bar equitable relief6l-
damages are an adequate remedy only when they place the plaintiff in
the position in which it formerly stood.62 Because the "concept of
irreparable injury takes on different meanings in different contexts,"'6 3
courts must consider all the circumstances of the case. To bar equita-
ble relief, the legal remedy must be as practical, prompt, proper, and
efficient as its equitable counterpart.6 1
§ 2.1, at 27 (1973); N. Fetter, Handbook of Equity Jurisprudence § 3, at 10-11
(1895); 1 J. High, supra note 53, § 28, at 42-43; 1 H. Joyce, supra note 53, § 26, at
52; W. Kerr, A Treatise on the Law and Practice of Injunctions in Equity § 5, at 3
(1871); 1 T. Spelling, Injunctions and Other Extraordinary Remedies § 4, at 4 (2d ed.
1901); W. Walsh, supra note 36, § 25, at 132-33; 11 C. Wright & A. Miller, supra
note 14, § 2944, at 394.
57. See 1 C. Beach, supra, note 53, § 34, at 41; N. Fetter, supra, note 56, § 186,
at 289-90; 1 H. Joyce, supra note 53, § 35, at 70; J. Lewis & T. Spelling, supra note
53, § 41, at 84, and accompanying text. See supra note 14 and accompanying text.
58. Traditionally-recognized factors of irreparability that do not receive a great
deal of attention in the case law are: 1) the necessity for the plaintiff to file a
multiplicity of lawsuits, 1 C. Beach, supra note 53, § 35, at 43-44; J. Eaton, supra
note 56, § 288, at 530; N. Fetter, supra note 56, § 186, at 290; J. Lewis & T. Spelling,
supra note 53, § 44, at 94; 1 T. Spelling, supra note 56, § 13, at 17, and 2) the
inability of the defendant to satisfy a money judgment, 1 C. Beach, supra note 53,
§ 34, at 42; J. Lewis & T. Spelling, supra note 53, § 41, at 85; 1 T. Spelling, supra
note 56, § 13, at 17.
59. Syntex Ophthalmics, Inc. v. Novicky, 214 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 272, 280-82
(N.D. Ill. 1982), aff'd sub nom. Syntex Ophthalmics, Inc. v. Tsuetaki, 701 F.2d 677
(7th Cir. 1983); Corn-Share, Inc. v. Computer Complex, Inc., 338 F. Supp. 1229,
1239 (E.D. Mich. 1971), aff'd, 458 F.2d 1341 (6th Cir. 1972); Lawter Int'l, Inc. v.
Carroll, 116 Ill. App. 3d 717, 730-31, 451 N.E.2d 1338, 1348 (1983); 1 H. Joyce,
supra note 53, § 36, at 72; J. Lewis & T. Spelling, supra note 53, § 40, at 85; 1 T.
Spelling, supra note 56, § 13, at 19; 11 C. Wright & A. Miller, supra note 14, 397-98.
60. The inability may be "due to the nature of the injury itself or the nature of
the right or property injured." J. Lewis & T. Spelling, supra note 53, § 40, at 81; see
Corn-Share, Inc. v. Computer Complex, Inc., 338 F. Supp. 1229, 1239 (E.D. Mich.
1971), aff'd, 458 F.2d 1341 (6th Cir. 1972); Newman v. Holobeam, Inc., 319 F.
Supp. 1389, 1391 (S.D.N.Y. 1970); Lawter Int'l Inc. v. Carroll, 116 111. App. 3d 717,
730-31, 451 N.E.2d 1338, 1347-48 (1983); 1 C. Beach, supra note 53, § 35, at 43-44;
J. Eaton, supra note 56, § 288, at 530; 1 H. Joyce, supra note 53, § 36; 1 T. Spelling,
supra note 56, § 13, at 19; 11 C. Wright & A. Miller, supra note 14, § 2944, at 399.
61. N. Fetter, supra note 56, § 186, at 290; 1 J. High, supra note 53, § 30, at 47;
see J. Eaton, supra note 56, § 288, at 530; 1 T. Spelling, supra note 56, § 13, at 19.
62. 1 J. High, supra note 53, § 30, at 48; 1 T. Spelling, supra note 56, § 13, at 19;
W. Walsh, supra note 36, § 25, at 134.
63. Leubsdorf, The Standard For Preliminary Injunctions, 91 Harv. L. Rev. 525,
551 (1978).
64. 1 J. High, supra note 53, § 30, at 47; 1 H. Joyce, supra note 53, § 26(a), at 54;
see 1 C. Beach, supra note 53, § 34, at 41-42; J. Lewis & T. Spelling, supra note 53,
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B. Irreparable Harm in Trade Secret Cases
In cases in which a preliminary injunction is sought, courts must
first determine the likelihood of an injury to the plaintiff before
deciding the question of irreparability.65 Two views have emerged in
trade secret cases on how likely the occurrence of an injury must be in
order to constitute a sufficient threat. The more lenient view requires
only that there be a possibility or risk of injury to the plaintiff. 66 Under
the majority view, however, the plaintiff must demonstrate with
greater certainty that the injury will occur6 7, though it need not suffer
actual injury to support its claim.68
§ 44, at 94; 1 T. Spelling, supra note 56, § 13, at 20; W. Walsh, supra note 36, § 25,
at 134 Leubsdorf, supra note 63, 551-55.
65. As one court noted: "There can be no irreparable injury without injury.
There can be no adjective modifying a noun if there is no noun." Arthur Murray
Dance Studios, Inc. v. Witter, 105 N.E.2d 685, 702 (Ohio C.P. 1952).
66. E.g., Schlumberger Technology Corp. v. Frentrop, 215 U.S.P.Q. (BNA)
1072, 1074 (D. Conn. 1981) (need not deal in absolutes to fulfill irreparable harm
requirement; possibility or substantial risk of injury is sufficient); Minnesota Mining
& Mfg. Co. v. Kirkevold, 87 F.R.D. 324, 337-38 (D. Minn. 1980) (possibility of
irreparable injury is sufficient when disclosure of trade secret by former employee is
inevitable); Continental Group, Inc. v. Kinsley, 422 F. Supp. 838, 843-44 (D. Conn.
1976) (plaintiff met burden of demonstrating substantial risk of irreparable injury
through disclosure of trade secret when former employee was involved in developing
identical product for competitor); see FMC Corp. v. Varco Int'l, Inc., 677 F.2d 500,
504-05 (5th Cir. 1982) (fear of irreparable injury from disclosure of trade secret is
realistic when former employee is in comparable position with one of the plaintiffs
competitors); Modern Controls, Inc. v. Andreadakis, 578 F.2d 1264, 1270 (8th Cir.
1978) (same). Even under this view, however, a "slight possibility" may not be
sufficient. Data Communication, Inc. v. Dirmeyer, 514 F. Supp. 26, 34 (E.D.N.Y.
1981).
67. See Cambridge Filter Corp. v. International Filter Co., 548 F. Supp. 1301,
1307 (D. Nev. 1982) (injunction will not issue to merely allay the fears of a plaintiff);
Merill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., v. E.F. Hutton & Co., 403 F. Supp.
336, 343 (E.D. Mich. 1975) ("injury must be both certain and great"). E.W. Bliss
Co. v. Struthers-Dunn, Inc., 291 F. Supp. 390, 400 (S.D. Iowa 1968) (substantial
threat of injury is required), rev'd on other grounds, 408 F.2d 1108 (8th Cir. 1969);
Allis-Chalmers Mfg. Co. v. Continental Aviation & Eng'g Corp., 255 F. Supp. 645,
654 (E.D. Mich. 1966) (same); Simplex Wire & Cable Co. v. Dulon, Inc., 196 F.
Supp. 437, 441 (E.D.N.Y. 1961) (plaintiff must at least demonstrate that injury is
likely to occur in order to justify preliminary injunction); 2 R. Callman, supra note
17, § 14.43, at 159-60; J. Eaton, supra note 56, § 288, at 530; 1 T. Spelling, supra
note 56, § 12, at 15.
In addition, some courts require that the injury be imminent. E.g., Continental
Group, Inc. v. Amoco Chems. Corp., 614 F.2d 351, 358-59 (3d Cir. 1980); In re
Arthur Treacher's Franchisee Litig., 537 F. Supp. 311, 319-20 (E.D. Pa. 1982);
Eaton Corp. v. Appliance Valves Corp., 526 F. Supp. 1172, 1181 (N.D. Ind. 1981).
68. American Eutectic Welding Alloys Sales Co. v. Rodriguez, 480 F.2d 223, 229
(1st Cir. 1973); Shorr Paper Prods., Inc. v. Frary, 74 Ill. App. 3d 498, 505, 392
N.E.2d 1148, 1153 (1979); System Concepts, Inc. v. Dixon, 669 P.2d 421, 428 (Utah
1983); see 1 C. Beach, supra note 53, § 34, at 41; J. Eaton, supra note 56, § 288, at
530; N. Fetter, supra note 56, § 186, at 290; J. Lewis & T. Spelling, supra note 53,
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Once the court determines that a sufficient potential for injury
exists, the question whether the injury is irreparable arises. Courts
tend to confuse the issues of misappropriation and irreparable injury:
Reliance on the confidential relation theory of liability results in an
overemphasis on the nature of the defendant's alleged misconduct in
the irreparable harm determination.6 9 This is demonstrated by a close
review of the case law"0 in which trade secret cases are categorized by
the nature of the alleged misappropriation.
§ 41, at 84; 1 T. Spelling, supra note 56, § 12, at 15; 11 C. Wright & A. Miller, supra
note 14, § 2944, at 401.
In determining whether the threat of injury is sufficient to warrant further in-
quiry, courts often look to the nature of the relationships between the parties. Thus,
an injury will be considered more likely to occur when the former employee works
for a new employer in a position similar to that which she held in the plaintiff's
employ. See FMC Corp. v. Varco Int'l, Inc., 677 F.2d 500, 505 (5th Cir. 1982);
Modern Controls, Inc. v. Andreadakis, 578 F.2d 1264, 1270 (8th Cir. 1978); Schlum-
berger Technology Corp. v. Frentrop, 215 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 1072, 1073-75 (D. Conn.
1981); Gillette Co. v. Williams, 360 F. Supp. 1171, 1178 (D. Conn. 1973); Mixing
Equip. Co. v. Philadelphia Gear, Inc., 312 F. Supp. 1269, 1274 (E.D. Pa. 1970),
modified, 436 F.2d 1308 (3d Cir. 1971); Allis-Chalmers Mfg. Co. v. Continental
Aviation & Eng'g Corp., 255 F. Supp. 645, 654 (E.D. Mich. 1966). For example, in
Modern Controls, defendant Andreadakis had helped to develop a flat panel gas
device for the plaintiff. 578 F.2d at 1266. Subsequently, he left the plaintiffs employ
to take a position with a new employer in which he was to work on the development
of an identical product. Id. at 1267, 1270. The court, noting that it was "unrealistic
to expect that Andreadakis [had] not utilized confidential information" gained while
in the plaintiff's employ, held that the threat of injury was sufficient. Id. at 1270.
The likelihood of injury will also be affected by the relationship between the
plaintiff and the employee's new employer, which is generally characterized by the
level of competition between the parties. See Syntex Ophthalmics, Inc. v. Novicky,
214 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 272, 278 (N.D. Ill. 1982), af'd sub nom. Syntex Ophthalmics,
Inc. v. Tsuetaki, 701 F.2d 677 (7th Cir. 1983); CPG Prods. Corp. v. Mego Corp.,
214 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 206, 214 (S.D. Ohio 1981); Minnesota Mining & Mfg. Co. v.
Kirkevold, 87 F.R.D. 324, 338 (D. Minn. 1980); Continental Group, Inc. v. Kinsley,
422 F. Supp. 838, 845 (D. Conn. 1976); Gillette Co. v. Willams, 360 F. Supp. 1171,
1178 (D. Conn. 1973); Simplex Wire & Cable Co. v. Dulon, Inc., 196 F. Supp. 437,
441 (E.D.N.Y. 1961). An illustrative case is Gillette, in which defendant Williams,
who was previously a key employee of the plaintiff, took a position with a competitor
of the plaintiff. 360 F. Supp. at 1175. The court, noting the fact that Williams' new
employer and the plaintiff were "fierce competitors," held that the likelihood of
injury to the plaintiff warranted further inquiry. Id. at 1178.
69. See infra notes 71-80 and accompanying text.
70. This Note focuses on preliminary injunctions in situations in which the secret
allegedly appropriated is something other than a customer list. Although customer
lists are included in the Restatement definition of trade secret, Restatement of Torts
§ 757 comment b (1939), these cases are excluded from the analysis because most
courts refuse to protect customer lists in the absence of a restrictive covenant between
the parties, 12 R. Milgrim, supra note 10, § 2.09[7], at 2-128, 2-132; see, e.g.,
Gillespie & Co. v. Weyerhaeuser Co., 533 F.2d 51, 53 (2d Cir. 1976) (per curiam);
Perfect Subscription Co. v. Kavaler, 427 F. Supp. 1289, 1296 (E.D. Pa. 1977);
Republic Sys. & Programming, Inc. v. Computer Assistance, Inc., 322 F. Supp. 619,
627-28 (D. Conn. 1970), aff'd, 440 F.2d 996 (2d Cir. 1971) (per curiam). But see
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In the first category of cases, the defendant knowingly misappropri-
ates a trade secret, as when, for example, a former employee inten-
tionally uses or discloses her previous employer's trade secret. These
cases involve situations in which the wrongfulness of the defendant's
conduct is unquestionable. Under these circumstances, courts regu-
larly find plaintiffs injury irreparable.'
Golden State Linen Serv. v. Vidalin, 69 Cal. App. 3d 1, 7-8, 137 Cal. Rptr. 807, 810-
11 (1st Dist. 1977); Fortune Personnel Agency v. Livingston, 102 Misc. 2d 369, 370,
423 N.Y.S.2d 360, 360 (1979). Trade secret protection, however, is not dependent
upon the existence of such covenants. Continental Group, Inc. v, Kinsley, 422 F.
Supp. 838, 844 (D. Conn. 1976); Blake, Employee Agreements Not to Compete, 73
Harv. L. Rev. 625, 671 (1960); see 12 R. Milgrim, supra note 10, § 3.02[1][d], at 3-
13. The problem may be that courts are reluctant to find that customer list informa-
tion is sufficiently novel to be a trade secret, see Bender II, supra note 44, at 51,
especially when the information contained in the list is readily available to the
public, see 12 R. Milgrim, supra note 10, § 2.09(7), at 2-121. This reluctance is
undoubtedly compounded by the vagueness of the novelty requirement under trade
secret law. See supra note 44. Analytically, however, there is no reason for distin-
guishing customer lists from other types of trade secrets. Accordingly, such informa-
tion should be afforded protection when the novelty requirement is satisfied.
71. Courts found the injury to the plaintiff irreparable in all ten of the reported
decisions in this category. Williams v. Curtiss Wright Corp., 681 F.2d 161, 163-64
(3d Cir. 1982) (per curiam) (district court's memorandum opinion, deeming injury to
the plaintiff irreparable, affirmed because the defendant-competitor knowingly ob-
tained the plaintiff's trade secrets from third parties); Dekar Indus. v. Bisset-Berman
Corp., 434 F.2d 1304, 1305-06 (9th Cir. 1970) (irreparable injury may stem from
competitive effects of wrongful exploitation of the plaintiffs trade secrets by the
defendants and the plaintiff's former employee), cert. denied, 402 U.S. 945 (1971);
American Can Co. v. Mansukhani, 216 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 1094, 1100 (E.D. Wis. 1982)
(injury to the plaintiff is irreparable when defendant uses appropriated trade secrets
to avoid development costs, and is thus able to manufacture and sell product at a
lower price); Syntex Ophthalmics, Inc. v. Novicky, 214 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 272, 280-82
(N.D. Ill. 1982) (when the plaintiff was previously the only manufacturer of product
with FDA approval, and a black market for product exists, legal remedy is inade-
quate due to an absence of accurate means to measure damages already estimated to
be between $3-7 million), affd sub nom. Syntex Ophthalmics, Inc. v. Tsuetaki, 701
F.2d 677 (7th Cir. 1983); Ecolaire, Inc. v. Crissman, 542 F. Supp. 196, 204-05 (E.D.
Pa. 1982) (irreparable harm will flow from the loss of investment, loss of customer
goodwill, and loss of employee goodwill, in the absence of a preliminary injunction
prohibiting appropriation and use of the plaintiff's confidential drawings); BPI Sys.,
v. Leith, 532 F. Supp. 208, 210 (W.D. Tex. 1981) (when the plaintiff alleged both
copyright infringement and misappropriation of trade secrets by independent con-
tractor, injury from unfair competition was deemed irreparable due to threatened
loss of profits and damage to reputation); Krapf Bus. Sys., v. Magnacontrol Corp.,
204 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 198, 203-04 (S.D. Ind. 1979) (injury to the plaintiff's customer
goodwill and business reputation deemed irreparable when disloyal employee and
cohorts misappropriated trade secrets enabling them to compete with the plaintiff
with minimal expenditure of time and resources); Sperry Rand Corp. v. Pentronix,
Inc., 311 F. Supp. 910, 923-24 (E.D. Pa. 1970) (damage to former employer's
competitive advantage in magnetic memory core field resulting from defendants'
misappropriation of trade secrets deemed irreparable); Atlantic Wool Combing Co.
v. Fibre Corp., 306 F. Supp. 69, 71 (D.R.I. 1969) (the defendant's apparent insol-
vency assures that the plaintiff's injury will be irreparable if the defendant is allowed
FORDHAM LAW REVIEW
In the second category of cases, the plaintiff seeks to enjoin a
defendant who acquired skills and trade secrets while in the plaintiff's
employ from using that knowledge in a competing enterprise. This
type of situation arises with greater frequency as a result of the
increased job mobility of technically-skilled employees, who may feel
entitled to take secret information acquired while working on projects
for their employer. 72 In balancing the respective rights of the parties, 73
courts generally hold that employees "may carry away their own
'faculties, skill, and experience.' -74 They may not, however, reveal
wrongfully to use the plaintiff's trade secrets); Lawter Int'l Inc. v. Carroll, 116 Ill.
App. 3d 717, 730-31, 451 N.E.2d 1338, 1347-48 (1983) (when a former employee is
about to use the plaintiff's trade secret to establish a competing business, the injury to
the plaintiff stemming from loss of business and customer goodwill is irreparable
owing to the difficulty in measuring damages, the inability of damages to fully
compensate the plaintiff, and the continuing nature of the transgression).
72. See supra note 10.
73. The rights involved are those of the employee to seek competitive employ-
ment and those of the employer to prevent the misappropriation of its trade secrets.
Balancing these rights is often a difficult problem. See Cataphote Corp. v. Hudson,
422 F.2d 1290, 1295 (5th Cir. 1970); E.I. duPont de Nemours & Co. v. American
Potash & Chem. Corp., 41 Del. Ch. 533, 547-48, 200 A.2d 428, 437 (1964); Walker
Employment Serv., Inc. v. Parkhurst, 300 Minn. 264, 271, 219 N.W.2d 437, 441
(1974); 2 R. Callman, supra note 17, § 14.24, at 89; 12 R. Milgrim, supra note 10,
§ 5.02[3], at 5-16; Blake, supra note 70, at 627, 651-86.
74. Developments In the Law-Competitive Torts, 77 Harv. L. Rev. 888, 950
(1964) (quoting Aronson v. Orlov, 228 Mass. 1, 5, 116 N.E. 951, 953, cert. denied,
245 U.S. 662 (1917)); see, e.g., CMI Corp. v. Jakob, 209 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 233, 237
(W.D. Okla. 1980) (permissible for employee with extensive skills and abilities to
reverse engineer and build a competitive machine); Pressure Science, Inc. v. Kramer,
413 F. Supp. 618, 625, 629 (D. Conn. 1976) (defendant's exercise of expertise in
position with new employer merely hastened the inevitable and was not actionable),
aff'd mem., 551 F.2d 301 (2d Cir. 1976); Structural Dynamics Research Corp. v.
Engineering Mechanics Research Corp., 401 F. Supp. 1102, 1111 (E.D. Mich. 1975)
(if employee's skills and experience were instrumental in developing a trade secret,
the employee is free to use and disclose the secret in the absence of an agreement not
to do so); Koehring Co. v. National Automatic Tool Co., 257 F. Supp. 282, 290 (S.D.
Ind. 1966) (knowledge acquired by the employee while working for the plaintiff did
not constitute trade secret information, and thus the employee was free to use the
knowledge in subsequent employment), af'd, 385 F.2d 414 (7th Cir. 1967) (per
curiam); Thomas v. Best Mfg. Corp., 234 Ga. 787, 788-89, 218 S.E.2d 68, 70 (1975)
(striking down overly broad restrictions on post-employment competitive activity);
Tad, Inc. v. Siebert, 63 Ill. App. 3d 1001, 1005-07, 380 N.E.2d 963, 967-68 (1978)
(key employees of a technical employee agency could leave and solicit customers and
other technical employees when both were well known); Parsons Mobile Prods., Inc.
v. Remmert, 216 Kan. 256, 259-60, 531 P.2d 428, 432-33 (1975) (officer and director
free to compete upon termination provided he does so in good faith and does not
expropriate corporate opportunities); Maryland Metals, Inc. v. Metzner, 282 Md. 31,
39, 382 A.2d 564, 569 (1978) (public policy favoring competition enables employees
to engage in activity preparatory to competition while employed); Collins v. F.A.
Bartlett Tree Expert Co., 112 N.H. 197, 197-98, 291 A.2d 614, 615-16 (1972) (per
curiam) (declaratory judgment finding unenforceable restrictive covenant obtained
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trade secrets or exercise unique skills that were obtained solely
through their employment.7 5 A majority of the courts that have de-
cided these cases has found the resulting injury to be irreparable,'76
although there is authority to the contrary.
77
when former employee had learned trade in school at his own expense and when no
trade secrets had been acquired); Reed, Roberts Assocs. v. Strauman, 40 N.Y.2d 303,
307-08, 353 N.E.2d 590, 593, 386 N.Y.S.2d 677, 680 (1976) (employee is free to use
skill even if it constitutes an artful variation from general practice).
75. See, e.g., Rohm & Haas Co. v. Adco Chem. Co., 689 F.2d 424, 432-33 (3d
Cir. 1982) (trial court erred in concluding that a failure of the plaintiff to sharply
define elements of the process automatically placed those elements within the depart-
ing employee's skills, knowledge and experience); Modern Controls, Inc. v. An-
dreadakis, 578 F.2d 1264, 1269 (8th Cir. 1978) (restrictive covenant enforceable
where employee with prior knowledge of electronic display field considerably broad-
ened his knowledge while working on secret projects for the plaintiff); Institutional
Management Corp. v. Translation Sys., 456 F. Supp. 661, 670-71 (D. Md. 1978)
(defendants went beyond allowable use of skills to point of misappropriation); Affili-
ated Hosp. Prods., Inc. v. Baldwin, 57 Ill. App. 3d 800, 807, 373 N.E.2d 1000, 1006
(1978) (defendant who possessed sufficient skills and experience to independently
develop machines engaged in wrongful conduct in taking the plaintiff's trade secret
drawings and allowing others to make competitive use of them); Koch Eng'g Co. v.
Faulconer, 227 Kan. 813, 816-29, 610 P.2d 1094, 1098-105 (1980) (defendant, a
former employee of the plaintiff with specialized training in distillation technology,
nonetheless received plaintiff's technology subject to a duty not to use); Aronson v.
Orlov, 228 Mass. 1, 5, 116 N.E. 951, 952-53 (former employees cannot use confiden-
tial information secured solely through their employment to injure the employer's
business), cert. denied, 245 U.S. 662 (1917); Vigitron, Inc. v. Ferguson, 120 N.H.
626, 630, 419 A.2d 1115, 1118-19 (1980) (employees breached duty of confidence by
attempting to misappropriate an invention developed by them for the employer);
Green v. Stratoflex, Inc., 596 S.W.2d 305, 309-10 (Tex. Civ. App. 1980) (prelimi-
nary injunction properly entered against defendant who, in addition to using his own
skills, had sought to misappropriate the plaintiff's trade secrets).
76. See, e.g., FMC Corp. v. Taiwan Tainan Giant Indus., No. 83-7945, slip op.
at 2183 (2d Cir. Mar. 6, 1984) (per curiam) (loss of trade secret cannot be measured
in money damages); FMC Corp. v. Varco Int'l, Inc., 677 F.2d 500, 505 (5th Cir.
1982) (when former employee is likely to disclose inadvertently the plaintiff's trade
secrets to the employee's new employer, the loss of substantial investment in time and
resources constitutes irreparable harm); Modern Controls, Inc. v. Andreadakis, 578
F.2d 1264, 1270 (8th Cir. 1978) (same); Hulsenbusch v. Davidson Rubber Co., 344
F.2d 730, 736 (8th Cir. 1965) (if former employee were permitted to continue to
divulge the plaintiff's trade secrets, the consequent injury to the plaintiff would be
irreparable), cert. denied, 382 U.S. 977 (1966); Schlumberger Technology Corp. v.
Frentrop, 215 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 1072, 1074 (D. Conn. 1981) (plaintiff would suffer
irreparable injury if not permitted to protect its expenditure of time and money and
prevent premature disclosure of its trade secrets); Minnesota Mining & Mfg. Co. v.
Kirkevold, 87 F.R.D. 324, 338 (D. Minn. 1980) (disclosure by former employee of
information that provides the plaintiff with a competitive advantage would cause an
irreparable injury); Continental Group, Inc. v. Kinsley, 422 F. Supp. 838, 844-46
(D. Conn. 1976) (when small number of companies were competing vigorously to be
among the first to develop new product with potentially enormous sales, and infor-
mation concerning one company's proximity to success would have considerable
value, the plaintiff was entitled to an injunction against former employee who
FORDHAM LAW REVIEW
The third category includes cases in which the plaintiff sues to
prevent an alleged appropriation of a trade secret by the defendant in
violation of a licensing or secrecy agreement. Unlike cases in the
preceding categories, at issue in these cases is whether the defendant
has the contractual right to exploit the trade secrets. In the typical
case, therefore, the plaintiff alleges that the defendant's misconduct
was willful, and the defendant claims that its conduct was merely an
exercise of its rights under the agreement. 7 There is no observable
tendency in these cases for courts to characterize the injury as irrepa-
rable. 79 The loss of competitive advantage appears less significant to
many courts when a licensing or secrecy agreement is involved. 80
threatened to disclose trade secret information to defendant); Mixing Equip. Co. v.
Philadelphia Gear, Inc., 312 F. Supp. 1269, 1274-76 (E.D. Pa. 1970) (when there is
a strong likelihood that former employee will inadvertently disclose trade secrets that
lend competitive advantage, the equities lie in favor of the plaintiff), modified, 436
F.2d 1308 (3d Cir. 1971); Allis-Chalmers Mfg. Co. v. Continental Aviation & Eng'g
Corp., 255 F. Supp. 645, 652 (E.D. Mich. 1966) (loss of research data, including
"negative test result[s]," would irreparably harm the plaintiff by injuring its competi-
tive advantage); Howard Schultz & Assocs. v. Ingram, 38 N.C. App. 422, 428, 248
S.E.2d 345, 349-50 (1978) (dissemination of the plaintiff's trade secrets would create
an injury which monetary damages could not compensate); Travenol Laboratories,
Inc. v. Turner, 30 N.C. App. 686, 694-95, 228 S.E.2d 478, 485 (1976) (disclosure of
the plaintiffs trade secrets by a former employee in field where several competitors
have unsuccessfully tried to develop similar information would cost the plaintiff a
"competitive advantage worth many thousands of dollars").
77. See Eaton Corp. v. Appliance Valves Corp., 526 F. Supp. 1172, 1181 (N.D.
Ind. 1981) (after concluding that threat of disclosure was not sufficient to warrant
injunctive relief, the court noted in dictum that the "interrelationship between price,
production and competition" would not render money damages unascertainable).
Some courts decline to find an irreparable injury absent actual use by the competing
employer. See Northern Petrochem. Co. v. Tomlinson, 484 F.2d 1057, 1059-60 (7th
Cir. 1973) (no irreparable harm shown when former employee divulges trade secrets
of the plaintiff to his new employer, but new employer does not immediately use the
information to compete with the plaintiff); Simplex Wire & Cable Co. v. Dulon,
Inc., 196 F. Supp. 437, 441 (E.D.N.Y. 1961) (mere possession of the plaintiff's trade
secrets, obtained through disclosure by the plaintiffs former employee, does not
constitute irreparable harm absent intended or actual use by the defendant).
78. See, e.g., Coin-Share, Inc. v. Computer Complex, Inc., 338 F. Supp. 1229,
1235-36 (E.D. Mich. 1971), afj'd, 458 F.2d 1341 (6th Cir. 1972); Foundry Servs.,
Inc. v. Beneflux Corp., 206 F.2d 214, 215 (2d Cir. 1953); Dotolo v. Schouten, 426
So. 2d 1013, 1014-15 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1983).
79. Compare Textron, Inc. v. Teleoperator Sys. Corp., 554 F. Supp. 315, 327
(E.D.N.Y. 1983) (loss of lead time in a field that will become increasingly competi-
tive will irreparably damage the plaintiff's competitive position) and CPG Prods.
Corp. v. Mego Corp., 214 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 206, 214 (S.D. Ohio 1981) (export of the
plaintiff's misappropriated trade secrets by the defendant would threaten their de-
struction, for which there would be no adequate remedy at law) and Klockner-
Humboldt-Deutz Aktiengesellschaft v. Hewitt-Robins Division of Litton Sys., 486 F.
Supp. 283, 286-87 (D.S.C. 1978) (defendant's flagrant misconduct in misappropriat-
ing the plaintiff's trade secrets and marketing an identical product will result in
irreparable harm to the plaintiff) and Coin-Share, Inc. v. Computer Complex, Inc.,
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Thus, the manner of the alleged appropriation is an influential
factor in determining the nature of the plaintiff's injury. The more
willful the misconduct, the greater the likelihood that the harm to the
plaintiff will be considered irreparable. In light of the persistence of
the confidential relation theory of liability, this result is not surpris-
ing. When a defendant asserts the right to act in a given manner, her
conduct is less likely to be perceived as reprehensible than when she
knowingly commits wrongful acts. The plaintiff's injury, however, is
unaffected by the defendant's state of mind. Courts that are overly
concerned with the exact nature of defendants' conduct may fail to
make this distinction.
C. Analytic Framework in Trade Secret Cases
Recognition of trade secrets as property would clarify the issue of
irreparability by focusing attention on the nature of the injury rather
than on the conduct of the defendant.8' Thus, more objective criteria
for the irreparability determination could evolve, and the results of
338 F. Supp. 1229, 1239 (E.D. Mich. 1971) (sale and further disclosure of the
plaintiff's trade secrets will cause irreparable injury to the plaintiff because of the
impossibility of calculating damages, the inability of damages to compensate the
plaintiff, and because the plaintiff's entire business would be placed in severe finan-
cial jeopardy), aff'd, 458 F.2d 1341 (6th Cir. 1972) and Dotolo v. Schouten, 426 So.
2d 1013, 1015 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1983) (recognizing that irreparable injury may be
presumed, especially in consideration of the continuing nature of the tort) with
Imperial Chem. Indus. v. National Distillers & Chem. Corp., 354 F.2d 459, 461 (2d
Cir. 1965) (plaintiff failed to prove that harm from permitting third party to retain
disclosures already made to it and from making further disclosures would be irrepa-
rable) and Foundry Servs., Inc. v. Beneflux Corp., 206 F.2d 214, 216 (2d Cir. 1953)
(mere dampening of sales not sufficient to classify injury irreparable because harm
could be fully compensated by money damages) and CPG Prods. Corp. v. Mego
Corp., 214 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 206, 214 (S.D. Ohio 1981) (damages ascertainable due to
low market demand for the product) (dictum) and Rapco Foam, Inc. v. Scientific
Applications, Inc., 479 F. Supp. 1027, 1031 (S.D.N.Y. 1979) (loss of competitive
advantage is merely one factor pointing toward irreparability of injury, and is not
sufficient, in itself, to warrant injunctive relief) and Newman v. Holobeam, Inc., 319
F. Supp. 1389, 1391 (S.D.N.Y. 1970) (injury resulting from the sale of machines
manufactured through the misuse of trade secrets is calculable, and can be compen-
sated through money damages).
80. All of the cases in which the injury was not deemed irreparable in this
category concluded that monetary damages would be adequate to compensate for the
loss of competitive advantage. Foundry Servs., Inc. v. Beneflux Corp., 206 F.2d 214,
216 (2d Cir. 1953); Newman v. Holobeam, Inc., 319 F. Supp. 1389, 1391 (S.D.N.Y.
1970); see Imperial Chem. Indus. v. National Distillers & Chem. Corp., 354 F.2d
459, 461 (2d Cir. 1965); CPG Prods. Corp. v. Mego Corp., 214 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 206,
214 (S.D. Ohio 1981); Rapco Foam, Inc. v. Scientific Applications, Inc., 479 F.
Supp. 1027, 1031 (S.D.N.Y. 1979).
81. Such emphasis is in accord with historical concepts of irreparable harm. See
supra note 60.
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trade secret cases would be more predictable. The danger exists,
however, that courts will ignore the traditional boundaries of their
equitable jurisdiction, and simply presume that the loss of competitive
advantage is irreparable.82 To illustrate, competitive losses may not be
serious enough to constitute irreparable harm when the defendant is
only one of many competitors in a product market because the defend-
ant's activities may not present a serious competitive threat to the
plaintiff.8 3 The nature of the injury can be determined only by refer-
ence to the surrounding circumstances. 84 In technologically-advanced
industries, there are several factors which may affect the irreparabil-
ity of an injury but have not received much attention in the case law.
First, the competitive nature of the market may make a loss of lead
time an important consideration in determining irreparability. 85 Al-
82. See, e.g., FMC Corp. v. Taiwan Tainan Giant Indus., No. 83-7945, slip op.
at 2183 (2d Cir. Mar. 6, 1984) (per curiam) (loss of trade secret cannot be measured
in money damages); Dekar Indus. v. Bisset-Berman Corp., 434 F.2d 1304, 1305-06
(9th Cir. 1970) (emphasizing the wrongfulness of defendants' conduct in determining
that the injury was irreparable), cert. denied, 402 U.S. 945 (1971); Minnesota
Mining & Mfg. Co. v. Kirkevold, 87 F.R.D. 324, 337-38 (D. Minn. 1980) (disclosure
that destroys competitive advantage would create an irreparable injury); Mixing
Equip. Co. v. Philadelphia Gear, Inc., 312 F. Supp. 1269, 1274-76 (E.D. Pa. 1970)
(equities lie with the plaintiff when loss of trade secret lending competitive advan-
tage is likely), modified, 436 F.2d 1308 (3d Cir. 1971); Dotolo v. Schouten, 426 So.
2d 1013, 1015 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1983) (irreparability can be presumed); Travenol
Laboratories, Inc. v. Turner, 30 N.C. App. 686, 694-95, 228 S.E.2d 478, 485 (1976)
(loss of competitive advantage worth many thousands of dollars is irreparable).
83. See McCormick v. Empire Accounts Serv., Inc., 49 Ill. App. 3d 415, 417-18,
364 N.E.2d 420, 422 (1977) (no irreparable injury to the plaintiff in competitive and
constantly changing marketplace when the plaintiff's former employee continues to
work for one of 250 competitors); cf. American Hardware Mut. Ins. Co. v. Moran,
545 F. Supp. 192, 199 (N.D. Ill. 1982) (court found that the plaintiff had failed to
show irreparable harm because it could still compete on a fair and equal basis), afJ'd,
705 F.2d 219 (7th Cir. 1983); CPG Prods. Corp. v. Mego Corp., 214 U.S.P.Q. (BNA)
206, 214 (S.D. Ohio 1981) (low market demand for product rendered calculable any
damages suffered by the plaintiff) (dictum).
84. See supra notes 61-64 and accompanying text; cf. Note, The Irreparable
Harm Requirement for Injunctive Relief in Antitrust Distributor Termination Cases:
Jack Kahn Music Co. v. Baldwin Piano & Organ Co. and the Wholesaler-Retailer
Distinction, 61 B.U.L. Rev. 507, 516 (1981) (In distributor termination cases, the
nature of the injury will determine the type of relief available.).
85. Raysman & Brown, supra note 1, at 2; see, e.g., Textron, Inc. v. Teleopera-
tor Sys., 554 F. Supp. 315, 327 (E.D.N.Y. 1983); Syntex Ophthalmics, Inc. v.
Novicky, 214 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 272, 281-82 (N.D. Ill. 1982), aff'd sub nom. Syntex
Ophthalmics, Inc. v. Tsuetaki, 701 F.2d 677 (7th Cir. 1983); Allis-Chalmers Mfg.
Co. v. Continental Aviation & Eng'g Corp., 255 F. Supp. 645, 652 (E.D. Mich.
1966); cf. Kubik, Inc. v. Hull, 56 Mich. App. 335, 363-64, 224 N.W.2d 80, 94-95
(1974) (although injunctive relief inappropriate due to broadened marketing after
misappropriation, early and wrongful marketing of hydrostatic drive equipment
gives rise to damages claim). In Textron, for example, the plaintiff and defendant
were corporations in the field of industrial robotics. 554 F. Supp. at 317. Noting that
defendant's appropriation would deprive the plaintiff of the right to be an initial
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though some courts view such an injury in terms of dampened profits
that can be adequately compensated by money damages, 86 depriving
the plaintiff of the opportunity to be first in a particular field may also
injure its business reputation. 87 The rapid pace at which companies
enter "high tech" product markets88 may make such a loss of business
reputation immeasurable and thus irreparable: Diminished confi-
dence in the plaintiff among its customers could result in untold losses
in future sales of unrelated products.8 9
To assess whether a loss of customer goodwill is irreparable, courts
should thoroughly examine the effects of the defendant's competition
on the plaintiff's business. Customer alienation might occur, for in-
stance, when the defendant is able to use an appropriated trade secret
to reproduce the plaintiffs product at a lower price. 0 The conse-
quences of such competition may be irreparable because the plaintiffs
customers may feel that they have been overcharged by the plaintiff
previously.9 1 By contrast, alienation that results from something other
than the appropriation or use of the secret, such as the defendant's
better customer service, cannot form the basis for an irreparable
injury because the plaintiff has the ability to prevent the alienation. 92
entrant into a field that will become "increasingly competitive with the developing
state of the art," the court held that the plaintiffs injury would be incalculable, and
thus irreparable. Id. at 327.
86. See supra note 80.
87. Injuries to business reputation are generally manifested through loss of cus-
tomer goodwill, which may constitute irreparable harm. E.g., American Can Co. v.
Mansukhani, 216 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 1094, 1100 (E.D. Wis. 1982); Ecolaire Inc. v.
Crissman, 542 F. Supp. 196, 204-05 (E.D Pa. 1982); Krapf Bus. Sys. v. Magnacon-
trol Corp., 204 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 198, 203-04 (S.D. Ind. 1979); see Coin-Share, Inc. v.
Computer Complex, Inc., 338 F. Supp. 1229, 1237 (E.D. Mich. 1971), aff'd, 458
F.2d 1341 (6th Cir. 1972); cf. Note, The Irreparable Harm Requirement for Injunc-
tive Relief in Antitrust Distributor Termination Cases: Jack Kahn Music Co. v.
Baldwin Piano & Organ and the Wholesaler-Retailer Distinction, 61 B.U.L. Rev.
507, 519-521 (1981) (loss of goodwill resulting from distributor termination may be
irreparable).
88. See supra note 9 and accompanying text.
89. Com-Share, Inc. v. Computer Complex, Inc., 338 F. Supp. 1229, 1237 (E.D
Mich. 1971), aff'd, 458 F.2d 1341 (6th Cir. 1972); see Ecolaire Inc. v. Crissman, 542
F. Supp. 196, 205 (E.D. Pa. 1982) (inability of the plaintiff to exercise quality control
over the product if relief not granted); cf. Jacobson & Co. v. Armstrong Cork Co.,
416 F. Supp. 564, 570 (S.D.N.Y. 1976) (distributor termination case), aff'd, 548 F.2d
438 (2d Cir. 1977); Supermarket Servs., Inc. v. Hartz Mountain Corp., 382 F. Supp.
1248, 1256 (S.D.N.Y. 1974) (same).
90. See American Can Co. v. Mansukhani, 216 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 1094, 1100
(E.D. Wis. 1982).
91. Id.
92. Injuries that can be prevented by the plaintiff are generally not considered
irreparable. 1 T. Spelling, supra note 56, § 13, at 19; 1 H. Joyce, supra note 53, § 34,
at 69; see 1 J. High, supra note 53, § 30, at 48.
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Loss of employee goodwill is another form of injury that may be
irreparable. 93 Such an injury may, for example, take the form of
incalculable losses in production and sales due to a decline in em-
ployee morale that occurs when the plaintiff's employees feel that the
fruits of their labor are being siphoned off by the misappropriator, 94
or when employees react adversely to stricter security measures insti-
tuted by their employer to prevent further appropriations of informa-
tion. 5 Moreover, if some employees can successfully misappropriate
trade secrets belonging to their employer, an incentive will be created
for other employees to do the same.96 As one court has observed,
employees who are "[irresistibly] lured by the prospect of huge profits
. . . may decide to exploit their inside 'know how,' " causing their
employer injury for which there is no accurate measure. 7
The absence of any standard by which damages can be measured is
an especially difficult problem when a secondary or "black" market
exists. 98 The pirating of products for these markets is a significant
problem in "high tech" industries99 and results in unquantifiable losses
to the plaintiff because there are no records to prove the total number
93. See Ecolaire Inc. v. Crissman, 542 F. Supp. 196, 205 (E.D. Pa. 1982); cf. F.
& M. Schaefer Corp. v. C. Schmidt & Sons, Inc., 597 F.2d 814, 818 (2d Cir. 1979)
(antitrust case); DeProspero v. The House of the Good Samaritan, 474 F. Supp. 552,
559 (N.D.N.Y. 1978) (labor case); Boyertown Burial Casket Co. v. Amedco, Inc.,
407 F. Supp. 811, 817 (E.D. Pa. 1976) (antitrust case).
94. Cf. F. & M. Schaefer Corp. v. C. Schmidt & Sons, Inc. 597 F.2d 814, 818
(2d Cir. 1979) (antitrust case); DeProspero v. The House of the Good Samaritan, 474
F. Supp. 552, 559 (N.D.N.Y. 1978) (labor case); Boyertown Burial Casket Co. v.
Amedco, Inc., 407 F. Supp. 811, 817 (E.D. Pa. 1976) (antitrust case).
95. This might occur when the plaintiff employer commences a program to
protect its trade secrets by requiring that employees sign non-disclosure agreements.
Loyal employees may be insulted by what they correctly perceive as their employer's
lack of trust. Additionally, disloyal employees, who were previously unaware of the
value of the information they possessed, may be tempted to use the information for
their personal gain. 12 R. Milgrim, supra note 10, § 3.02[2], at 3-89 to -90.
A plaintiff that alleges an irreparable loss of employee goodwill must demonstate
that the threat of injury is in fact sufficient to warrant injunctive relief. See supra
notes 65-67 and accompanying text. The plaintiff's burden may be more difficult
when the alleged irreparable injury is the result of a loss of employee goodwill than
when a loss of competitive advantage or customer goodwill is alleged. A loss of
employee goodwill is dependent on the characteristics of the plaintiff's employees,
while the latter forms of injury are a function of the more rational, and thus
predictable, product market.
96. Ecolaire Inc. v. Crissman, 542 F. Supp. 196, 205 (E.D. Pa. 1982).
97. id.
98. Syntex Ophthalmics, Inc. v. Novicky, 214 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 272, 282 (N.D.
Ill. 1982), aff'd sub nom. Syntex Ophthalmics, Inc. v. Tsuetaki, 701 F.2d 677 (7th
Cir. 1983).
99. See Arthurs, supra note 9, at 34; Nicholson & Sandza, supra note 10,
Newsweek, July 5, 1982, at 54; Reinhold, Spinoff Suits Mount in Silicon Valley, N.Y.
Times, Jan. 3, 1984, at D1, col. 1.
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of sales lost.'00 Consequently, courts should be aware of the possibility
that such markets exist and consider losses resulting from this competi-
tion as irreparable.
CONCLUSION
There is little doubt that trade secret protection can be enhanced by
preventing abuses of confidential relationships. Protection against the
breach of a confidential relationship, however, is a limited form of
protection not designed to promote the public interest in encouraging
invention. Thus, liability for the breach of a confidential relationship
should be treated under the law of agency, not the law of trade
secrets. Recognition that the appropriation of a trade secret is consid-
ered an infringement of a property right, rather than merely a breach
of confidence, will better serve the goal of encouraging invention.
Moreover, by clarifying the irreparability analysis, such recognition
will help to assure proper exercises of courts' equitable jurisdiction.
Edmond Gabbay
100. See Syntex Ophthalmics, Inc. v. Novicky, 214 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 272, 281-82
(N.D. Ill. 1982), aff'd sub nom. Syntex Ophthalmics, Inc. v. Tsuetaki, 701 F.2d 677
(7th Cir. 1983).
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